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Miscalculating Welfare
Baby-selling.1 Racial discrimination.2 Insider trading.3 Legal economists have
argued that each of these activities should be legalized in the service of wealth
maximization. Indeed, these are just a few of the legions of contrarian proposals
advanced by legal economists as efficient. Such proposals are at least counterintuitive,
and perhaps even shocking. In fact, from a careerist perspective, their startling quality
may be their primary virtue. But in pursuing the attention that comes with novelty, the
authors of these works have overlooked the negative externalities that also accompany
avant-garde positions. Legal rules that strike most people as unjust may upset
community expectations and undermine the efficiency of the very rules proposed. In
short, such rules may not prove wealth-maximizing at all.
Counterintuitive rules are even less likely to prove welfare maximizing. The
proclaimed goal of economics is to find welfare-maximizing policies. Because of the
difficulties associated with measuring welfare, many economists – and the vast majority
of legal economists – focus instead on wealth maximization, under the generally implicit
assumption that social welfare rises monotonically with social wealth. This assumption
is badly flawed. People often express a willingness to trade some material wealth in
exchange for intangible values such as justice, fairness, or even predictability. Unjust
seeming rules, then, are even more unlikely to maximize social welfare than they are to
enhance social wealth. To truly enhance social welfare, economists should examine more
closely the relationship between wealth, social values, and welfare.
1

Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(1978).
2
RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
(1992).
3

Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
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In this essay, we argue that legal economists’ failure to include people’s
preferences for fairness undermines their policy prescriptions, even by economists’ own
maximizing standards. Part I discusses three prominent counterintuitive proposals from
legal economists. Our purpose here is not to engage the authors’ arguments in detail, but
rather to provide a context for the rest of our discussion. Part II first argues that the
proper focus of law and economics is welfare and not wealth, and legal economists
should not assume welfare is enhanced whenever wealth is maximized. Part II then turns
to the people’s preferences for fair rules. Here, we discuss the empirical evidence of
people’s preferences for fair rules, and argue that given this evidence, it is
methodologically unacceptable for legal economists to fail to include (and to give
sufficient weight to) these preferences within their calculations. Part III discusses the
likely costs of actually adopting rules that are broadly perceived as surprising and unfair.
We point out that such rules are likely to defeat reasonable expectations, instigate
resistance, and undermine the overall legitimacy of the legal system. As a result, we
believe these proposals fail even on their own wealth-maximizing terms. Part IV
discusses the market hidden behind this discussion – the market for this sort of creative,
but counterintuitive, legal scholarship. Here, we discuss the positive and negative effects
of lending legitimacy to and rewarding these sorts of counterintuitive proposals.
I.

A Few Salient Examples
The Law and Economics literature is rife with examples of proposals that would

strike most non-economists as unfair, immoral, or at least unexpected. In this section, we
highlight a few prominent examples to concretize the phenomena and ground our
subsequent discussion. In a way, this section was the most difficult for us to write, not
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because we had difficulty finding suitable examples but because we found so very many.
Nevertheless, we have managed to limit our textual discussion to three.4
A. Baby Selling
Richard Posner is generally considered the most prominent legal economist alive
today. In 1978 he and coauthor Elisabeth Landes proposed that baby selling (their term
not ours) be legalized.5 Despite the shocking terminology, the authors’ intentions were
manifestly benign. They argued that creating an open and legal market permitting an
adoptive parent to pay a natural mother for the right to adopt her child would have
numerous positive effects. Paying mothers for their children would reduce the number of
abortions, eliminate the shortage of babies available for adoption, and decrease the
number of unadopted children kept in foster care.6 Their article employed sophisticated
mathematical modeling and statistical data to bolster their argument that legalizing baby
sales would produce these beneficent policy outcomes.
Posner and Landes acknowledged that many people would consider a market in
children “undesirable.”7 They cited commentators who referred to such a market as
“dealings in human flesh” and a “taint on civilized society.”8 They also admitted that
permitting natural parents to sell their children might “smack of slavery”9 and produce

4
For interested readers, we note here some other promising candidates. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen
Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group
Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81 (2007) (group punishment); James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand
the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 69 (1997) (settling disputes by lottery); Moin A.
Yahya, Deterring Roper's Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach to Show that the Logic of
Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More than Adults, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 53 (2006)
(executing minors).
5

Landes and Posner, supra note 1.
Id. at 325, 327.
7
Id. at 339.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 344.
6
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“moral outrage.”10 But they argued that these objections were not well-founded. Unlike
slaves, children sold through their system would retain the protections of legal
prohibitions on child abuse and neglect, though these protections might admittedly prove
inadequate.11 Also, while a market system would not screen parents for suitability the
way the current system does, they doubted the value of such screening and proposed
requiring some “minimal background investigation” for buyers in the baby market, a sort
of driver’s license for baby purchasers.12 Landes and Posner took comfort in their faith
that people do not generally buy expensive items in order to damage them, analogizing
adoption of a child to the purchase of a television set.13
Perhaps their most telling point is their analysis of the likely costs of babies in the
newly legalized market. Although the black market for babies resulted in very high
prices, they argued that in a legal market babies would be relatively affordable.14 They
had several supportive arguments, but the most interesting for our purposes involved the
amount necessary to compensate the natural mother for giving up her baby rather than
aborting the pregnancy or raising the child herself. Landes and Posner contended that the
net cost in this category would be quite low because the costs to the natural mother would
be substantially identical to those saved by the adoptive mother in not bearing a child
herself.15 While this theory might have some validity when applied to medical costs,16
we think most mothers would find quite surprising the proposition that the amount they

10

Id. at 345.
Id. at 343.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 339-41.
15
Id. at 340.
16
Even when applied to medical costs, we actually doubt the theory’s validity. Presumably, mothers giving
up their children would tend to be of much lower economic status than adopting mothers, and therefore
much less likely to have adequate medical insurance.
11
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1102819

would demand to give up their children consists mostly of the medical costs they incurred
during pregnancy and birth. The emotional toll of giving up a baby is not a cost the
adoptive mother would face if she bore the child. Landes and Posner’s argument to the
contrary highlights the problem we are illustrating, that legal economists frequently
ignore (or intentionally attempt to contradict) most people’s feelings about what the law
should be. This tendency may have sharply deleterious consequences, as we argue
below.
B. Racial Discrimination
In his landmark 1992 book, Forbidden Grounds,17 Richard Epstein relied on
economic arguments to explain why the laws prohibiting racial discrimination in
employment should be repealed.18 Epstein’s arguments are no more premised on malice
towards racial minorities than Landes and Posner’s were based on hatred of babies. To
the contrary, Epstein believes that laws prohibiting racial discrimination actually harm
racial minorities (along with everyone else) and that repealing these laws would benefit
everyone.19
Epstein premised his case on the notion that discrimination may sometimes
reduce agency costs and therefore prove efficient.20 Governance costs rise as the tastes of
the firm’s members and employees diverge.21 One way to reduce agency costs and
promote harmony within the firm, then, is to hire employees with similar tastes.22
Employees who share the same tastes in music, Epstein illustrated, will not quarrel over

17

EPSTEIN, supra note 2.
Epstein also argued against laws prohibiting gender, age, and disability discrimination. Id. at 9.
19
Id. at 57-75.
20
Id. at 59-65
21
Id. at 57.
22
Id.
18
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what type of music to play in a common workspace.23 Finding workers with similar
tastes will often result in hiring a disproportionate number of some particular racial
minority, whose members may be more likely to share some tastes than the components
of a more diverse group.24
Another way to reduce agency costs is to recruit through a third party referrer who
implicitly bonds the workers’ performance.25 For an example, Epstein drew on the case
of the Daniel Lamp Company.26 The Daniel Lamp Company established relationships
with two Hispanic groups, the Spanish Coalition and the Latino Youth Organization,
which each recommended unskilled workers for employment.27 The organizations then
had a vested interest in ensuring that the workers they recommended were of high
quality, since otherwise the company would stop trusting them for referrals and they
would lose a valuable opportunity for their members.28 This system resulted in cheap
bonding for the workers and an inexpensive source of reliable labor, helping to maximize
the company’s earnings.29 The system also resulted in the company hiring mostly
Hispanic workers and commensurate liability under the antidiscrimination laws.30
Finally, Epstein pointed out that if bigots concentrated themselves in firms that
discriminated against racial minorities, firms that did not discriminate would end up
relatively bigot-free. Without the interference of antidiscrimination laws, this would be
likely to occur. Bigots would likely to seek out firms that discriminated, since they
strongly preferred to avoid contact with racial minorities. By means of the bigots’ self23

Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 63-64.
25
Id. at 70-71.
26
Id. at 70-71.
27
Id. at 70.
28
Id. at 70-71.
29
Id. at 71.
30
Id. at 70-71.
24
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selection, firms that did not discriminate would have few bigots, even if the companies
themselves were indifferent as to whether their employees were bigots (which is
unlikely). Firms without bigots should be easier to manage and therefore face lower
governance costs.31
Epstein fully understood that his proposal was alarming. On the very first page of
his book he stated, “There is little question that a broad antidiscrimination principle lies
at the core of American political and intellectual understandings of a just and proper
society, not only in employment but also in housing and public accommodations, medical
care, education, indeed in all areas of public and private life.”32 He reiterated this point
several times in different ways, stating that the antidiscrimination statutes command
“enormous support” from U.S. elites,33 quoting President George Herbert Walker Bush
vilifying discrimination as a “‘fundamental evil that tears at the fabric of our society,’”34
and claiming that even as strong and independent an institution as the United States
Supreme Court could not “withstand the pounding that would result of it undertook a
frontal assault on the basic antidiscrimination norm.”35 Nevertheless, he concluded that
the antidiscrimination statutes should be repealed.36 Discrimination should be legal
because it was often rational and wealth-maximizing.37
C. Insider Trading
Our final example comes from the world of the securities markets. For most
people who buy or sell publicly trades securities, stock transactions are anonymous and
31

Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 1.
33
Id. at 3.
34
Id. at 3.
35
Id. at 6.
36
Id. at 9 (advocating the repeal of Title VII as it applies to private employers operating in competitive
markets without legal protections against new entries).
37
Id. at 68-69.
32
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impersonal. Most market participants rely on the integrity of an enormous market and
the hard work, intelligence, and powerful incentives of literally thousands of
sophisticated traders and analysts to produce the most accurate stock prices possible
based on the information publicly available. While some market participants are better at
divining the future direction of equity prices than others – witness Warren Buffet – we
can all at least take comfort in the thought that the playing field is level.
Some potential buyers and sellers, however, may have a significant advantage
unconnected to their native talents or diligence. Officers, directors, employees and
agents of public corporations may, in the course of their duties, learn important
information – information that could affect market prices – that has not been released to
the public. For these insiders, trading in their company’s stock is like playing poker with
a marked deck only they can read.
Largely for this reason, insider trading has been prohibited in the United States for
generations. The primary justifications for the ban have always been fairness and the
perception of fairness. The ban’s advocates have argued that it is unfair to allow
corporate insiders who possess material, confidential information to trade with market
participants who lack that private information.38 They have also argued that investors
will not participate in a market they perceive to be unfair, or rigged in favor of insiders.39

38

See In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961) (concern that uninformed may be exploited);
Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Assessment, 70
CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982) (rule’s acceptance rests in intuition that insider trading is unfair); Donald C.
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1321 (1999) (rationale is that insiders should not be permitted to take advantage of
shareholders); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L.
REV. 117, 124-125 (1982) (insider trading violates fairness goals).
39
See H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 4 (1984) (insider trading undermines confidence in the markets); Victor
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 322, 356-57 (1979) (Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was in part to restore public
trust in the markets).
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The laws banning insider trading, then, are based both on a sense of fair play for its own
sake and on a more pragmatic concern that the markets will not function if they appear to
give some players an unfair advantage.
Despite these concerns, renowned legal economists Dennis Carlton and Daniel
Fischel argued in the Stanford Law Review that insider trading should be permitted.40
Carlton and Fischel acknowledged that many consider insider trading unfair, but
concluded that the practice was efficient nonetheless.41 They argued that insider trading
would at least in some cases promote more accurate securities prices.42 Insider trading
provides an alternative avenue of communication from the firm to investors.43 When the
market detects insiders trading, it adjusts the company’s stock price accordingly, bidding
the price up higher if insiders are buying and reducing the price if insiders are selling.44
The end result under ideal conditions may approach the effect of actually disclosing the
inside information.45 Companies may prefer to disclose through insider trading for a
number of reasons, such as when disclosure would destroy the value of the information
(such as the presence of oil under land the company is considering buying) or when the
information is uncertain and the company wishes to avoid liability for a misdisclosure if
the information turns out to be false.46 Accurate pricing is wealth-maximizing for a

40

Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3. They are certainly not alone. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 718-19 (1980) (permitting insider
trading would result in more accurate securities prices); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law
Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565-76 (1970) (same).
41

Id. at 858, 880-882.
Id. at 865-68.
43
Id. at 868.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 868.
42
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number of reasons, but chiefly because correct prices permit investors to reduce their
investments in discovering improperly valued securities.47
Carlton and Fischel also contended that insider trading would constitute a more
efficient way to compensate and hire managers.48 Shareholders desire compensation
schemes that will induce managers to seek out and implement high expected value
opportunities.49 Legalizing insider trading may produce the correct incentives.50 Insider
trading rewards managers who discover good opportunities and put them into effect by
permitting them to trade in advance of public knowledge of the company’s imminent
success.51 Insider trading may prove a cheaper method of incentivizing managers than
renegotiating each time a corporate opportunity arises or structuring complicated
incentives contracts ex ante.52 In addition, insider trading may turn out to be a valuable
screening tool in selecting managers who will work hard and will take efficient levels of
risks.53 Since insider trading rewards hard-working managers who create profitable
opportunities for the corporation, only such managers should be willing to accept insider
trading as a substantial component of their compensation.54 These are precisely the
managers corporations generally want to hire.55
Carlton and Fischel acknowledged that insider trading might not always be
efficient for every corporation.56 They discussed numerous concerns that might render
insider trading disadvantageous for some companies in some circumstances, such as the
47

Id. at 866-67.
Id. at 869-72.
49
Id. at 869-71.
50
Id. at 870-71.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 871-72.
54
Id. at 871-72.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 861-66.
48
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moral hazard problem and issues concerning disclosure timing.57 The inherent unfairness
of insider trading to non-insider market participants, however, received short shrift. In a
few short paragraphs, the authors argued that if insider trading is efficient, and therefore
increases the total resources to be divided, then it benefits both insiders and outsiders as a
class.58 In other words, since insider trading makes even outsiders wealthier than they
would be without insider trading, the practice cannot be unfair.
These three examples – baby selling, employment discrimination, and insider
trading – highlight the tendency of legal economists to treat fairness concerns as largely
irrelevant to their policy recommendations. Legal rules that produce greater wealth
should be chosen even if – perhaps especially if – they contradict commonly-held notions
of justice and fair play. In Section III, we argue that this strategy is misguided under both
wealth maximization and welfare maximization frameworks.
II.

Wealth, Welfare and Fairness
In this section, we introduce two methodological difficulties. First, legal

economists often focus on wealth as a proxy for maximizing welfare. However, it is
social welfare that economists seek to enhance, and wealth is often a poor approximation
of welfare. Second, legal economists discount people’s preferences for fairness, at most
mentioning that their proposals run contrary to these tastes. In this section, we argue that
there is robust empirical evidence of people’s preference for fairness and that this
preference cannot be ignored in legal economists’ welfare calculations.

57
58

Id. at 872-82.
Id. at 880-82.
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A.

Wealth v. Welfare

Over twenty-five years ago, in a famous pair of articles, Richard Posner argued
that the goal of legal economists should be to divine the policies that would promote
wealth maximization, rather than welfare maximization.59 While the extreme version of
this view of wealth maximization as moral theory has been energetically criticized (and
Posner himself has disavowed this view),60 economists often defend wealth maximization
models as a useful simplification that tracks social welfare.61 More importantly, in
practice legal economists overwhelmingly use wealth maximization models, rather than
welfare maximization.62
This tendency courts frequent and substantial analytical errors. Wealth does not
equate with welfare. To the contrary, under many circumstances people will willingly
trade material goods for other values, such as distributional fairness or justice.
Experience provides numerous examples of such choices, such as blood donations,
charitable gifts, and wealthy people supporting more sharply progressive taxes. While
considerable ingenuity has been devoted to developing strategic explanations for some of

59

Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 103 (1979); Richard
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 487 (1980).
60
See LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 35 n.41 (2002).
61
See, e.g., id. at 37; Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99-100 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (defending the use of
wealth maximization models in choosing legal rules). As Ed Diener and Martin Seligman explain:
In microeconomics…, the standard assumption is that, other things being equal, more choices
mean a higher quality of life because people with choices select courses of action that maximize
their well-being. Because income correlates with number of choices, greater income is equivalent
to higher well-being. This formulation is standard in economics, where income is seen as the
essence of well-being, and therefore measures of income are seen as sufficient indices to capture
well-being.
Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being, 5 PSYC. SCI. IN
PUBLIC INT. 1, 2 (2004).
62
See, e.g., KAPLOW AND SHAVELL, supra note 60, at 100-103, 124-133, 174-203, 232-241, & 254-272
(using wealth maximization models).
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these behaviors,63 experiments such as the ultimatum game verify the widely-held
intuition that wealth often yields to other values.64
Among the greatest challenges to equating wealth with welfare is the growing
happiness research.65 In arguing that the well-being should be pursued directly, Diener
and Seligman note the many problems with assuming that money does buy happiness,
including that there are diminishing returns for individuals’ higher incomes and that
increased societal wealth does not translate into increased individual happiness.66 On the
other hand, form of government, trusting communities, and religion increase well-being,
but cannot be measured by wealth.67 Moreover, even when income and well-being are
related, the relationship is complicated. Money is more likely to buy happiness in poorer
societies.68 And, happy people tend to make more money, thus calling into question the
causal relationship.69 The focus on money may have played a role in simplifying the
economist’s task, but recent research reveals that economists have oversimplified it.
Although we will doubtlessly need to continue to rely on money in some instances,70 the
happiness literature raises a flag of caution.
63

See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
For example, Ruben Durante and Louis Putterman recently conducted a fascinating experiment that
found that a large majority of subjects were willing to give up a significant portion of the game’s payoff in
“taxes” in exchange for a more equal distribution of profits. See Ruben Durante & Louis Putterman,
Preferences for Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study (July 27, 2007).
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004573.
65
Notably , there are a number of methodological difficulties with current happiness research. See Diener
& Seligman, supra note 61, at 3-4.
66
Id. at 5-6.
67
Id. at 6-7.
68
Id. at 7-8.
69
Id. at 8-9.
70
As Adler and Posner see it, abandoning the assumption that money impacts well-being would have
profound implications:
The premise that money has no impact on well-being would not merely explode CBA[cost-benefit
analysis], by leading to undefined [compensating variations]. It would also have radical
implications for other practices even more central to the legal system than CBA, such as judicial
damage awards in tort and contract cases, antitrust law, and progressive taxation. The
compensatory rationale for awards would evaporate.
64
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B.

Fairness
1.

Fairness as a Preference

Within welfare economics, an actor’s concern for fairness is simply one
preference among others. Hence, to the extent that citizens express a preference for
fairness, this preference – like preferences for money or happiness – must be taken into
account. Some welfare economists label this preference for fairness, a “taste for
fairness.”71
For our purposes here, we will use the term “fairness” as a rough proxy for otherregarding preferences that deviate from the presumption that individuals prefer those
things in their rational self-interest. That is, individuals may have fairness preferences in
equality and proportionality, but they may also be motivated by altruism or envy.72
Because this essay is an internal critique of law and economics, we will take
seriously the claim that fairness concerns are simply preferences. But before doing so,
we wish to note two ways in which fairness may be more than simply a preference.
First, welfare economists must make initial determinations about how to
aggregate preferences. Does everyone count? Does everyone count equally? These
questions cannot be answered without making value judgments. Moreover, a selection
among distributive approaches will have an effect on the outcome of the social welfare
function. For example, a decision to count everyone’s preferences equally yields a very
different result than counting only the preferences of white males. Crucially, the decision

Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis (forthcoming Journal
of Legal Studies) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999928, (manuscript at 19).
71
As described by Kaplow and Shavell, individuals may have “a taste for a notion of fairness, just as they
may have a taste for art, nature, or fine wine.” KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 60, at 21.
72

For an empirical attempt to distinguish among these preferences, see Jeremy Clark, Fairness in Public
Good Provision: An Investigation of Preferences for Equality and Proportionality, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON.
708 (1998).
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between these possibilities must be made by a criterion outside of the welfare counting
mechanism itself. Welfare economists must therefore make a critical decision – how to
aggregate social welfare – on the basis of some value other than efficiency (such as
“fairness”) in order to perform any economic analysis.73
Second, many theorists believe that fairness concerns may trump otherwise
welfare maximizing rules. In the hypothetical case “Surgeon,”74 a surgeon seeks to cut
up one healthy individual and distribute his organs to five sick individuals.75 Theorists
argue that even if this rule were welfare maximizing,76 cutting up one individual would
be impermissible because doing so would be appropriating him.77
At this point, however, we would like to put these two (substantial) concerns to
the side. For the remainder of this essay, we will try to assess the strength of the “taste
for fairness,” and argue that, even when fairness is viewed as a taste, economists are
paying too little attention to how this taste may undermine not only the legal rule that
they are proposing but also the legal regime as a whole.
2.

Evidence of the Preference for Fairness

A thorough empirical calculation must include all factors that could influence the
result. Of course, some factors may not be statistically significant, and depending upon
one’s discipline and the need for exact calculations, some factors may be ignored.
However, the mere lip service that is given to the taste for fairness within the legal
73

On these points, see generally Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow
and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002).
74

See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, reprinted in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION & RISK: ESSAYS IN
MORAL THEORY 95 (1986).
75

For the argument that such a rule would not be Pareto superior, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Some
Sound and Fury from Kaplow and Shavell, 23 LAW & PHIL. 73, 82 (2004).

76

That is, assuming that this would not lead to great social instability and so forth (the very repercussions
we discuss below).
77

Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification, 24 LAW & PHIL. 611,
615-616 (2005).
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economist’s typical empirical conclusions is utterly unacceptable. The taste for fairness
is pervasive, and the preference for fairness is very strong.
At the outset, we note that we do not need to rely on empirical studies to make
this claim. The taste for fairness is patent within our society. Children complain if a rule
is “unfair” but not if it is inefficient. We teach our children what it means to deserve
praise and blame. And, we teach our children not to discriminate against people of
different sexes, races, or religions; to believe that humans may not be bought or sold; and
to value fair play.
However, we can make our case beyond even these obvious observations. The
taste for fairness runs deep. Consider first the capuchin monkey.78 Scientists conducted
tests in which they gave capuchins food in exchange for rocks.79 Capuchins like
cucumbers and happily exchange cucumbers for rocks.80 However, capuchins prefer
grapes to cucumbers.81 (Who wouldn’t?) During the test, the scientists gave some
monkeys grapes for rocks and others cucumbers for rocks.82 The cucumber-receiving
monkeys stopped exchanging the rocks for food or refused to eat the cucumber – “a
directly accessible food that they readily accept and consume under almost any other set
of circumstances.”83 From this, the researchers concluded that capuchins “measure
reward in relative terms, comparing their own rewards with those available, and their
own efforts with those of others.”84 Thus, to a monkey, it is not simply about how many
rewards one may receive, but how well off one is compared to others.
78

Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE 297(2003).
Id. at 299.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 298.
84
Id. at 299.
79
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Even among human beings, the scientific documentation of the taste for fairness
is robust. Individuals have tastes for fairness that run contrary to rational actor
assumptions. One study asked individuals how tickets should be distributed in a case in
which demand exceeded supply.85 The subjects’ clear order of preferences was standing
in line, then a lottery, then an auction.86 Of course, economic predictions run in the exact
opposite order – favoring auctions (he who values the ticket most will pay most) and
disfavoring lines (which are wasteful).
Perhaps the most famous endorsement of fairness is the ultimatum game.87 In the
ultimatum game, two subjects are told that they will split a sum of money. One subject
proposes how the two will split the money. The second subject then either accepts or
rejects the offer. If the offer is accepted, the money is split according to the offer’s terms.
If the offer is rejected, neither subject receives anything. Purely rational actors in the
proposing role would offer a split in which the offeror receives nearly all the money and
the offeree receives next to nothing. Purely rational offerees would accept these offers
because even very little money is better than nothing. Each subject plays the game only
once, so there are no incentives to cooperate stemming from a repeat play strategy. In a
result surprising only to economists, across many cultures offerors often propose a
roughly even split (around 40% on average), and offerees faced with drastically unfair
proposals frequently reject the offer.88 In other words, the ultimatum game demonstrates
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robustly that people willingly sacrifice their pecuniary self-interest to promote other
values such as fairness.
These are but a few of the empirical studies that clearly demonstrate that
individuals have a strong preference for fairness. Indeed, this preference is sometimes
stronger than any preference individuals have to act in their rational self-interest.
Because individuals weight fairness so heavily, any policy that seeks to enhance their
welfare must take account of their fairness preferences.
3.

Responses to Fairness

Given the empirical evidence of the taste for fairness, one should expect that
fairness significantly figures into social welfare calculations made by legal economists.
This, however, is not the case. Rather, legal economists seem to adopt one of two
strategies. Some have simply ignored it. Others have attempted to explain fairness away.
More often than not, fairness is simply ignored. As Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler, have noted:
The economic agent is assumed to be law-abiding but not “fair” – if fairness
implies that some legal opportunities for gain are not exploited. This nonfairness
assumption expresses a resistance to explanations of economic actions in moral
terms that has deep roots in the history of the discipline. The central insight that
gave rise to modern economics is that the common good is well served by the free
actions of self-interested agents in a market.89

AM. ECON. REV. 73 (2001); Hessel Oosterbeek, et. al, Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments:
Evidence From a Meta-Analysis, 7 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 171 (2004) (although exact percentages vary
quite a bit, the average of the means of the offered shares is approximately 40%).
89
Kahneman et al., supra note 85, at S286.

18

As Kahneman, Knetsh, and Thaler note, there are two possible reasons for this
neglect – one substantive and one methodological.90 The substantive claim is that one
may believe that there is no real substantive content to fairness. If fairness concerns are
really just charades for self-interest then there is no need to account for fairness needs
separately. The methodological claim is simply this – things just get too complicated
when theorists must take into account fairness calculations. If the benefit of economic
modeling is answers, the more factors, the more complicated the model, the harder those
answers are to come by.
Taking the methodological rationale first, we simply believe that this factor
cannot be ignored. Legal economists are presumably making policy recommendations
that they believe should become the law. The calculations may be complicated.
However, if a theorist is going to advocate for a particular position as the welfaremaximizing one, then that policy should truly – all things considered – maximize welfare.
As for the substantive claim, it seems to us that the burden is on legal economists
to show – through empirical data—that the impact of fairness is not statistically
significant or is simply self-interest in disguise. However, given the current data that
exists, the taste for fairness runs deep and must be accounted for, not ignored.
Some legal economists attempt to undermine the role of fairness by explaining
our attachment to it. For instance, Harvard legal economists Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell present a two-step argument against fairness.91 First, they link fairness theories
to social norms. Here, they assert a causal thesis to explain why the reader is attracted to
fairness, arguing that the attachment to fairness theories comes from their similarity to
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social norms that are inborn (via evolution) or inculcated. Second, Kaplow and Shavell
argue that social norms themselves should not provide an independent basis for making
legal policy decisions. They claim that social norms serve as rules of thumb for
advancing social welfare and have evolved or were indoctrinated for this purpose; hence,
because welfare economics can calculate social welfare directly, reliance on these social
norm proxies is unnecessary.92
There are two problems with this argument. First, a causal explanation of a belief
does not undermine the truth of that belief. As Jules Coleman noted, “the view that the
existence of a causal explanation of the facts that someone holds or asserts a particular
claim undermines the truth of the claim asserted simply cannot be sustained.”93 Indeed,
as Coleman notes, even if evolution selected for beliefs, why would it select for false
beliefs over true ones?94 Second, Kaplow and Shavell’s move from the observation that
social norms enhance welfare to the claim that they were inculated for this purpose is a
non sequitur.95 There are other alternative explanations for why fairness beliefs may
often be welfare enhancing. Fairness beliefs and social norms may be linked by a
common morality, and, even if not aimed at maximizing welfare, it would be a very shortlived morality that did not somehow enhance it.
Ultimately, taking Kaplow and Shavell’s claim to its logical conclusion would
lead to a complete refusal to count fairness at all. Although Kaplow and Shavell claim to
be willing to include fairness as a preference (when empirically demonstrated, though
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they doubt this will often be the case),96 their argument – that fairness is just a rough
proxy for a welfare-enhancing standard – amounts to an argument that fairness is just a
mistaken preference. That is, people, were they to know how a legal rule would effect
them, would no longer prefer the fair rule. However, given that Kaplow and Shavell
claim that mistaken preferences are not entitled to any weight,97 it seems that they cannot
give any weight to fairness. Because their argument dissolves fairness completely,
Kaplow and Shavell will have to put forth a more compelling argument for why it is
simply a mistaken preference. To this point, they have not met their burden.98
III.

The Perils of Ignoring Fairness
In this section, we argue that, when theorists fail to take fairness into account,

their results may be neither wealth nor welfare maximizing. The rule itself may not
maximize wealth or welfare because it defeats reasonable expectations or even instigates
resistance. Additionally, the legal rule may have significant negative externalities – it
may undermine the legal system as a whole.
A. Getting the Calculation Wrong: The Failure of the Legal Rule to Maximize
1.

Defeating Reasonable Expectations

In a democracy, people should and generally do expect the country’s laws to be
fair and to make sound intuitive sense. For small-scale transactions, those whose value
does not justify paying for sophisticated legal assistance, the participants are likely to rely
primarily on their intuition as to the content of the governing background rules. These
96
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expectations are reasonable and will be, in the aggregate, heavily relied upon. Legal
rules that go against the grain of expectations will be ignored in such transactions,
rendering even the most interesting and potentially efficient rules useless in instilling
appropriate incentives. A large part of any rule’s value lies not in the results it produces
in litigation but in the shadow it casts on behavior outside of litigation. These motivating
effects are severely diluted to the extent they fall below the radar of their targets and run
counter to intuition.
Worse, litigation over such small-scale transactions will likely unwind the parties’
precautions and produce unjust windfalls. At the time they enter into their transaction,
both parties likely think the governing rule is the intuitive rule. That rule allocates rights
to the parties in a way they both understand and consider to be fair. They build the
transaction around the rule as they think it to be, and price the deal accordingly. They
also take whatever steps they think prudent to ensure performance and to insure against
risk based on their understanding of how the law will allocate each party’s rights and
duties. If the parties later have a dispute arising from the transaction, the court will
declare victory for one party over the other on the basis of the actual legal rule in effect.
When the legal rule produces a different result from the rule the parties thought applied,
their preparations are likely to go awry. Plus, the surprised victor will gain a windfall at
the expense of the dismayed loser. The parties agree to the contract price with a common
understanding that they are allocating certain entitlements to each. When the court
reverses the parties’ distribution, it essentially forces the losing party to pay for the
entitlement twice: once as part of the contract price and a second time as damages from
the litigation.
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Although high-value transactions guided by expensive counsel seem less
vulnerable to this phenomenon, rules governing obscure or rare aspects of the transaction
may suffer from a similar dynamic. Even experienced lawyers are unlikely to be aware
of rules that cover relatively rare situations. A lawyer uncertain about the law could
expend resources in research to discover the truth, but that search will occur only when
the lawyer is aware of his or her ignorance. In the more likely situation in which a
lawyer is unaware that a special exception exists, that exception may be ignored until it is
too late, again defeating expectations.
To understand this dynamic more concretely, imagine that a state adopted a law
reinstating the doctrine of caveat emptor (buyer beware) for a narrow class of contracts
only, say contracts dealing with the sale of used cars by used car dealers. Ignoring the
expectation problems described in this section, such a rule might be efficient. In such
sales, both parties can easily be placed on roughly equal footing. While the seller
possesses more information about the car’s history, that advantage can easily be
eliminated by the buyer’s hiring a mechanic to inspect the car or making the sale
contingent on a complete disclosure of the car’s maintenance records. In this context,
then, there may not be any great need to overcome legal economists’ usual presumption,
illustrated by all three of our introductory examples, that freedom of contract should
triumph over any regulatory impulses to protect one side or the other in a transaction.
Our claim is not that such a rule would actually be efficient – we can certainly see some
arguments that alternative rules might be better, such as the advantages of imposing
liability on the party with more information ex ante – but only that there are sufficiently
strong arguments in its favor that it is reasonable to suppose it might be efficient.
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Once we consider the rule’s effects on settled expectations, however, the rule’s
efficiency becomes much more doubtful. In the last few generations, American
consumers have increasingly come to expect a certain level of fairness protection in their
transactions, especially in their transactions with relatively sophisticated counterparties.
In fact, this caveat emptor proposal would represent a significant change in the existing
law of most states. The sale of a car is regulated by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, since cars are movable goods.99 Article 2 applies certain implied warranties in the
absence of express disclaimers.100 One of these is the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability, which provides that, unless excluded, a warranty is implied in the sale of
goods by a merchant (such as a used car dealer) that the goods will be “merchantable,”
meaning essentially that they are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used.101 Many states provide even more protection in the form of “lemon laws,” which
provide enhanced remedies when dealers sell consumers cars that are in particularly poor
shape and cannot be adequately repaired.102 The proposed caveat emptor rule, by
contrast, would not imply any warranties at all. Instead, the background default rule
would provide that buyers of used cars took them on a strictly “as-is” basis, even if they
turned out not to run.
The caveat emptor rule, then, would represent a sharp diversion from consumers’
current expectations. Consumers buying used cars from dealers expect a certain level of
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basic protection. While at one time this may not have been true – witness the still
lingering reputation of used car dealers as untrustworthy – we suspect Article 2 and the
passage of lemon laws in many states have largely changed consumers’ expectations.
Consumers now are much less likely to take precautions when buying a used car from a
dealer, such as having the car inspected by a mechanic or insisting on a written warranty.
Should the law change to a regime of caveat emptor, these consumers would go
unprotected and often end up with a “lemon” without recourse against the dealer. Over
time, consumer groups might manage to educate the public about the new need to take
greater care, but until then (and for many consumers, even after then), consumers as a
group would likely suffer a substantial loss from the adoption of the new rule. This loss
detracts greatly from the proposal’s efficiency, perhaps enough to outweigh whatever
gains might be made from the increased freedom of contract. At a minimum, legal
economists have paid insufficient attention to the effect on settled expectations, an
important factor in measuring a proposal’s efficiency.
2.

Instigating Resistance

While the last section discussed a fairly technical problem that is often overlooked
by economists, in this section we focus on an issue further afield from the rational actor
model legal economists favor. Legal economists tend to think of people’s attitudes
towards rules as reflective of their underlying pecuniary interests. Corporations care
about maximizing their profits; individuals care about maximizing their income. Both
corporations and individuals will support policies that enhance their financial prospects
and oppose those policies that will likely cause them economic harm. But actual human
beings often care most about concerns that are entirely non-pecuniary and will sometimes
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willingly suffer financial losses in order to further other interests. Although it would be
trite to state this in any non-economic context, human beings often care deeply about
justice, equality, freedom, fairness, and religion, to name but a few of humanity’s core
non-pecuniary concerns.
Non-pecuniary interests are often the most powerful motivators of human
behavior, and social engineers such as legal economists ignore them at their peril. In
particular, individuals who find a particular law offensive may actively attempt to
circumvent it and undermine its enforcement even when such opposition is costly. This
behavior may impair the efficiency benefits that would come from broad compliance.
As an example of this problem, let us imagine that Congress adopted Richard
Epstein’s proposal to eliminate the antidiscrimination statutes. Epstein argued that
permitting discrimination would be efficient mostly because it would permit companies
to reduce agency costs.103 He posited that some companies would choose to hire
primarily members of a particular race as a way to unify workers’ tastes and make the
business easier to govern.104 Other companies that did not discriminate would also
benefit from this rule, because the discriminating companies would siphon off most of the
bigots, who presumably are difficult to manage in racially diverse companies.105
But what would actually happen to a company that adopted an expressly
discriminatory hiring policy? Anti-discrimination norms have taken deep roots in the
past two generations. Under these conditions, who would do business with a company
that blatantly discriminated in hiring? Even a company that adopted its discrimination
policy quietly would risk exposure every time an applicant of a disfavored race was
103
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rejected despite excellent qualifications. In fact, it would be difficult for a company to
reap the benefits Epstein identified without making some public statement of its policy,
so that members of the privileged race would know to apply in greater numbers (not to
mention the bigots). Once a company’s discrimination policy was revealed to the public,
it would no doubt face immediate public condemnation and boycotts organized by groups
representing the excluded races. Indeed, the boycotts would likely be joined by groups
representing every race and religious group, since no race (and no representative group)
would want to be seen as condoning racial discrimination. It is difficult to imagine that
any company that stuck to an express discriminatory hiring policy could long survive,
regardless of the policy’s legality. The apparent efficiencies Epstein argued could be
gained by eliminating the legal restrictions on racial discrimination evaporate once we
take into account people’s likely resistance to laws they strongly oppose.106
Epstein’s proposal represents perhaps an extreme, in that nearly everyone at least
publicly expresses opposition to racial discrimination. Other proposals might be less
universally condemned and therefore receive less effusive opposition. But our point
holds true for any policy that a sizable group passionately disapproves on principled
grounds. A sufficiently outraged opposition will take steps to undermine the law it
disputes, even when such opposition’s expense far outweighs any anticipated material
benefits from a policy change. The resulting costs should be taken into account when
determining if a proposed law is truly wealth maximizing.
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B. The Hidden Externalities of Unfair Rules: Undermining Moral Norms and
Legitimacy

1.

Why Citizens Obey the Law

Why do people obey the law? This question poses a difficult puzzle, especially
for economists. For example, there are many goods and services we would very much
enjoy consuming but which, as academics, we cannot easily afford. Why do we refrain
from simply taking them? Why, in short, do we obey the law prohibiting us from
stealing?
Economists’ answer focuses on deterrence. The law induces obedience by
establishing appropriate incentives. We obey the law because the law ensures that it is in
our interests to do so.107 The law can set up these incentives either by promising rewards
for compliance or by threatening punishment for disobedience.
The law’s success in coaxing obedience depends on the credibility of the
threatened punishment which in turn hinges on both the likelihood of detection and the
magnitude of punishment.108 If we believe we are almost certain to be caught and
punished, we are much less likely to steal than if we believe we are likely to escape with
the stolen goods. Deterrence is costly. To make the threat of punishment credible, a
government must invest heavily in police, courts, and prisons, both to increase the
perceived risk of capture and to actually imprison those who are caught and convicted.
For this reason, economists’ vision of the law’s goal is not necessarily to achieve perfect
deterrence – and therefore perfect obedience – but rather to find the point at which the
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next dollar spent on deterring crime yields less than one dollar’s worth of crime
prevention.109 The goal, in other words, is an efficient level of crime.
Though the workings of deterrence are fine in theory, in practice, an efficient
level of crime is elusive. As Paul Robinson and John Darley have documented, there is
little reason to believe that criminal law deters (at least through this mathematical
formula).110 Between the low chance of being caught, convicted, and sentenced to
prison, the prison sentence itself is unlikely to have a strong deterrent effect.
Indeed, while economists believe that citizens obey the law because they are
threatened into obedience, other scholars who have studied this question take a broader
view of the possible causes of obedience.111 Sociologists, social psychologists, and
political scientists argue that important factors in addition to deterrence include peer
attitudes towards crime, internal moral norms, and the legitimacy of the government
institutions that create, administer, and enforce the law.112 Deterrence and peer attitudes
are both externally imposed methods of achieving obedience, while internal moral norms
and legitimacy are internally motivated sources of compliance.113 These four sources of
obedience are interrelated, so that a change in one may have a greater or lesser impact
through resulting changes in the others.
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In some cases, deterrence is a factor. Material incentives are an important
determinant of human behavior. Not surprisingly, since this is the element economists
favor, incentives are the factor least likely to be directly affected by the choice of
counterintuitive or apparently unfair rules. As long as the incentives are clear and wellknown, they should tend to make the desired behavior more likely (and the undesired
behavior less likely). But the results frequently will be less straightforward than
economists predict, depending on the remaining three factors.
Peer attitudes towards compliance with the law, in contrast, may tend to
undermine obedience of rules that are surprising or seem unfair. Tom Tyler’s seminal
Chicago study of legal adherence demonstrated that people distinguish among different
laws when asked whether their peers would disapprove if they were arrested for
committing one of a series of crimes.114 While only about half of respondents felt that
their peers would disapprove if they were arrested for making too much noise, littering,
speeding, or parking illegally, the vast majority of respondents predicted their peers
would disapprove if they were arrested for drunk driving (86%) or shoplifting (89%).115
Tyler’s study demonstrated that anticipated peer attitudes vary with the seriousness or
moral blameworthiness of the crime. Crimes that appear less blameworthy, either
because they cause less harm or do not violate a core moral precept, garner less peer
censure than those likely to cause great harm (such as drunk driving) or which do violate
fundamental moral principles (such as the prohibition against theft). Laws that outlaw
conduct that appears harmless or innocent are unlikely to provoke much peer criticism
when they are violated. These rules are consequently less likely to be obeyed.
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Economists who focus solely on material incentives in predicting compliance will
therefore greatly overstate the likelihood of observance of counterintuitive or seemingly
unfair rules.
Like peer attitudes, internal moral norms are less likely to lead to enforcement of
odd or immoral laws. Tyler’s Chicago study demonstrated that most people feel that
breaking the law is morally wrong, and that this is one of the major reasons why people
tend to obey the law.116 To the extent people do not feel a particular law parallels their
personal morality, then, internal moral norms are far less likely to induce compliance.117
This effect should prove particularly powerful when people believe a law opposes their
morality. We see a dramatic example of this effect in abortion foes who bomb clinics.
Although they know that destruction of property is illegal, they proceed because they
believe their actions serve a higher moral purpose, that of preventing what they perceive
to be legally sanctioned murder. They choose to violate laws they presumably agree with
(those banning destruction of others’ property) in order to prevent enforcement of a law
they virulently oppose (that legalizing abortion). While this is an extreme example, it
does illustrate the guiding principle: people are less likely to obey a law that is not
reinforced by their internal moral norms.
The fourth and final source of obedience comes from a law’s legitimacy.
“Legitimacy” refers to the perceived obligation to obey.118 Citizens may feel an
obligation to obey a law or a legal authority (such as a leader, judge, or police officer)
116
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when that law or authority stems from a process or institution that they feel creates an
adequate justification for obedience.119 For example, Americans who believe in
representational democracy may feel that a statute passed by both the House and the
Senate and signed by the President should be obeyed even if they disagree with the
statute’s substance. The institutions that promulgated the law are rooted in a principle –
representational democracy – that most Americans feel rightly demands their obedience.
As a result, those institutions have a great deal of legitimacy in American political culture
and can often induce compliance even from those who dissent from particular policy
decisions.
Legitimacy is a variable sociological characteristic, however, not a physical
constant. The legitimacy of sources of law and those who enforce it may decline if the
laws seem wrong or bizarre. As a result, people may stop obeying even laws that do not
seem strange because the overall legitimacy of the system is undermined. Sociological
studies support this notion that those who oppose the decisions of legal institutions also
feel those institutions are less legitimate.120 Legitimacy thus provides some maneuvering
room for governmental agents to advance policies that may not be popular, but legitimacy
is ultimately linked to a government’s ability to fulfill its people’s desires.121 A
government that advances laws that appear immoral or strange may find its legitimacy
undermined. Legal economists should consider these risks when arguing for such
proposals, because the harmful effects on the government’s legitimacy may far outweigh
119
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any marginal efficiency gained by adopting counterintuitive rules. Counterintuitive
and/or unfair rules may sometimes prove wealth-maximizing. But that calculation is far
more complex than most legal economists have heretofore acknowledged. Such rules
may have nuanced effects on social wealth through their effect on expectations, their
conflict with non-pecuniary interests, and their deleterious impact on citizens’ tendency
to obey the law.
Applying these findings of Tyler’s and others, Paul Robinson and John Darley
contend that the criminal law is best served by conforming to citizens’ perceptions of just
desert.122 As they argue, criminal law serves an essential function in both shaping and
enforcing moral norms.123 When citizens perceive a rule to be unfair, this may
undermine the criminal law’s legitimacy and the willingness of citizens to defer to the
law in unclear cases.124 As Robinson and Darley forcefully argue, legal economists’
prescriptions to deviate from desert are far from costless, but rather, may significantly
undermine crime control.125
2.

The “Flouting Thesis”

Very little has been done to test the empirical assumption that unfair rules will
undermine overall faith in the justice system. Still, it seems that any theorist who argues
that his counterintuitive rule is efficient is implicitly (albeit unwittingly) making the
claim that, even taking into account the extent to which this rule undermines citizen
respect for the law, it is still the best rule. And, because the legal economist is making
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such a claim, the burden lies on the economist to address and to refute any arguments that
this rule will be more detrimental than beneficial.
Moreover, preliminary research does confirm that the legal economist must take
these concerns seriously. One theorist who has attempted to understand the extent to
which an unfair rule will undermine overall faith in the system is Janice Nadler.126
Nadler recently examined the assumed but unproven “Flouting Thesis.” “When a person
evaluates particular legal rules, decisions or practices as unjust, the diminished respect for
the legal system that follows can destabilize otherwise law-abiding behavior.”127
In one experiment, subjects were exposed to many newspaper stories including a
series of stories that portrayed laws as just or unjust.128 Then, for an ostensibly unrelated
purpose, the subjects were asked to participate in a filling out a questionnaire on their
likelihood of criminal behavior.129 The questionnaire listed “borderline” crimes such as
drinking underage, taking home office supplies for personal use, and making illegal
photocopies of software.130 As predicted, those subjects exposed to stories discussing
unjust laws indicated a greater willingness to break the law than those exposed to news
stories about just laws.131
Nadler also conducted two experiments involving mock trials. In the first
experiment, undergraduate students served as subjects.132 They watched a news story
that depicted either a just or an unjust outcome.133 They were then asked to participate in
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a (supposedly unrelated) mock trial.134 In this mock trial, the defendant stole a shopping
cart and was clearly guilty; however, subjects also knew that because this was his third
felony, the defendant would receive a life sentence with no possibility of parole.135 In
this study, the Flouting Thesis was not confirmed. There was no statistically significant
correlation between the just or unjust prime and the decision to nullify.136
Nadler then conducted the study with different participants. She sent an email to
over a thousand participants, ultimately yielding subjects 60% female, 82 % white, mean
age of 37, with 66% from the United States.137 These subjects read the news story (rather
than watching it on television) and then read a description of the mock trial, and were
asked their verdicts.138 Under these conditions, the Flouting Thesis was confirmed.139
There is certainly more empirical work to be done. Nadler’s research confirms,
however, that the “Flouting Thesis” is not just a matter of theoretical concern. Unfair
rules may ultimately undermine the law itself.
Let us return to the proposals with which we began. Imagine that laws were
enacted that allowed for baby selling, discrimination, and insider trading. We now see
that these sorts of laws may undermine the law’s overall legitimacy. If most people
believe that discrimination is acutely wrongful, then they will view the law as making a
profound moral mistake in allowing for discrimination. As mentioned above, it is
entirely possible that they would then be less willing to defer to the law as a source of
moral advice when they are unsure of what to do. Thus, even if these laws are wealth or
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welfare maximizing in the individual case, they may ultimately have significant external
costs that do not render them wealth or welfare maximizing when considering the legal
system as a whole.
We also note that there is another possibility: citizens believe that the law is
giving them moral advice, and they then come to believe that these wrongful acts are
acceptable even in situations beyond the legal economists’ calculations. For instance,
assume that Carlton and Fischel’s proposal is adopted and insider trading is legalized.
Once the law becomes understood as endorsing these “unfair” practices, citizens may
view it as more permissible to engage in activity the social norm (and even the law)
forbids. Rather than recognizing that insider trading is a rather narrow exception to the
norm against cheating, citizens may cease to believe in a norm of fair play. If individuals
with inside information may permissibly use this information to their material advantage,
citizens may decide that there is nothing wrong with failing to reveal a material defect in
their home or their used car. And, what is a little bit of income tax evasion if insiders are
permitted to cheat?
3.

Undermining Rule of Law Values

There is one final way in which the law may lose its power. The legal rule may
undermine the social norm, and the fairness belief itself. That is, even assuming that
Kaplow and Shavell are correct and fairness rules are but imperfect proxies for complex
social welfare standards, the economist cannot ignore the value of having rules.140 When
legal economists urge that we look beyond fairness beliefs to see whether in any
particular case a rule is maximizing, they are choosing between the value of rules and the
value of standards. This trade-off must also be accounted for in their calculations.
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The rule versus standards debate is perhaps most famously embodied in the
debate between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo. To Holmes, the
“featureless generality” of negligence would ultimately give way to specific per se rules,
such as “stop, look, and listen.”141 But Cardozo had the last word, holding that such per
se rules could not take into account all the circumstances so as to adjudicate correctly
negligence liability in future cases.142
There are values to having rules as opposed to standards.143 First, rules can solve
physical coordination problems. In situations in which there are several different (and
incompatible ways) to resolve a problem (for example, which side of the street to drive
on), a rule can offer a solution.144 Rules can also solve social coordination problems. To
the extent that the morally right thing to do turns in part of what others are likely to do
(for instance, a prisoner’s dilemma), rules provide a basis for prediction.145
But rules have other values as well. The rule promulgator may have greater moral
or factual knowledge than a citizen.146 Additionally, rules help avert errors. When a
complex decision must be made, actors who must decide under a standard – analyzing a
multitude of factors – may simply get the calculations wrong.147 And, by having a rule,
decision-making costs are reduced.148 As Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin have
explained, “The quality that identifies a rule and distinguishes it from a standard is the
141
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quality of determinateness. . . . [A] rule is a posited norm that fulfills the function of
posited norms, that is, that settles the question of what ought to be done.”149
Despite the values of rules, the problem is that rules may be overinclusive.150
This is, of course, Kaplow and Shavell’s complaint. If the standard is welfare
maximization, and a fairness rule is but a rough proxy, the rule may sometimes be
wrong.151 Interestingly, however, rules are effective only because citizens do not
frequently question whether they should follow a rule in any particular case.152
For our purposes, what is essential to note is that even if fairness rules only serve
a proxy function, undermining that function may have devastating effects in cases in
which we want citizens to follow the rule. Ultimately, the value of legal rules is
consequentialist. We pursue the Good through indirect rules, rather than through direct
calculations, because we are more likely to achieve the Good indirectly.153 Thus, the
stability of these sorts of rules is required for us to be able to achieve the Good in the vast
majority of cases.154 Hence, even if the underlying consequentalist standard (assuming
this is what underlies the rule, of course) dictates that discrimination, or cheating, or baby
selling is the appropriate course in one specific set of circumstances, this sort of deviation
from the norms of fairness and equality may undermine the value of the rules themselves.
A legal economist cannot afford to ignore such consequences.
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IV.

The Unexamined Market
There is, perhaps, a more interesting market that we should explore: the market

for this sort of scholarship. The Stanford Law Review, the Journal of Legal Studies, and
Harvard University Press – the publishers of the examples with which we began – are
extremely prestigious. To the extent that the publishers seek to publish only the best and
aim to signal that the work meets such standards of excellence, why is it that there is such
a reward structure for these sorts of counterintuitive answers?
In our view, the failure to account for fairness preferences is a fatal flaw in these
proposals. By the measure of their own discipline, legal economists are ignoring a
variable that affects their ultimate conclusions. It is therefore significantly troubling that
publishers who should be evaluating these papers are more influenced by the creative and
countintuitive nature of the proposals than their rigor.
Of course, because we have argued that one must consider the externalities of
one’s proposals, we should consider whether the legal academy is better or worse off for
these contributions. There are significant worries here. The value placed on
counterintuitive thinking may lead young scholars to believe that this is the only sort of
policy recommendation that should be made – and that unless they, too, come up with
bizarre and outlandish ideas, they will never advance in the academy. (We know people
who think this.)
Another concern is that these sorts of proposals can bring the academy into
disrepute. If the ivory tower is not just a tower, but a tarnished tower, legal academics
create more distance between themselves and actual policy makers. How many
politicians would like to be viewed as aligned with “baby selling” and discriminatory
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hiring practices? Casting these proposals in this rhetoric, and taking economics to the
extreme may not result in better public policy – just politicians with no trust in the legal
academy.
On the other hand, there are competing positive benefits. We might question
whether rewarding these sort of proposals encourages creativity. Then, even if these
proposals are not welfare maximizing, encouraging this sort of thinking may maximize
welfare.
This is an empirical question. But we will give one example. At a recent
Association of American Law Schools meeting, Professor Ian Ayres discussed his career
path. When asked what “turned him on” professionally, he replied, “intellectual
perversity.”155 Now, Ayres is the author of one counterintuitive proposal that we would
likely condemn. In a 1989 article,156 Ayres and his co-author Robert Gertner famously
introduced the concept of “penalty defaults.”157 At that time, when faced with an
incomplete contract, commentators had urged courts to set default rules as what the
parties would have wanted.158 Ayres and Gertner, however, argued for penalty defaults
that are set “at what the parties would not want – in order to encourage the parties to
reveal information to each other and to third parties.”159 “Penalty defaults are designed to
give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and
therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision that they prefer.”160
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This is exactly the sort of policy that defeats reasonable expectations. Indeed, the
entire goal is to defeat such expectations so that parties will negotiate around the penalty
default. However, the value of such a rule depends upon knowing that the rule exists.
Moreover, as mentioned above, this rule may undermine citizens’ belief in the
legal system as a whole. Setting a default rule that penalizes a party hardly seems like a
“fair” default. Citizens may have a hard time grasping the rationale behind this rule; they
will only understand that the rule penalizes a party for some ephemeral purpose.
Despite the fact that we worry about this specific proposal, however, there may be
value to encouraging this sort of scholarship more generally. The same person who
“thought outside of the box” to bring us penalty defaults has also come up with clever
and unique answers to other problems. This “practiced creativity” led Ayres to question
whether car retailers discriminate (he finds they do161) and whether there are
discriminatory practices in taxicab tipping.162 And, his ability to turn questions inside out
has led to a rather unique approach to gay rights. Together with Jennifer Brown, Ayres
advocates certification marks that employers and businesses can use to designate that
they do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.163 This mark thus allows
those citizens who support gay rights to use their market power to enforce equality, rather
than trying to use the law to sanction it. 164 So, having rewarded Ayres’ creative thinking
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in an instance in which his proposal was counterproductive, the scholarship market
rewarded creative thinking that led to productive and innovative answers to other policy
questions.165
Ultimately then, any discussion of what sort of scholarship leads to the greatest
welfare maximization must also take into account the broader picture. Though we cannot
resolve this empirical question, we certainly believe that those who seek to advance these
counterintuitive proposals should be aware of the potential consequences.

Conclusion
In this essay, we have sought to urge legal economists to take fairness concerns
seriously. There is robust evidence that individuals have a preference for fair rules.
Without taking these strong preferences into account, a legal economist cannot be sure
that his proposal is actually welfare-maximizing. Moreover, even if a proposal is
discretely maximizing, an unfair rule may do significant damage to the value of the rule
of law itself. In the face of this empirical evidence, legal economists, who fail to take
fairness preference into account, are ignoring a variable essential to their calculations.
Perhaps the failure to include fairness concerns reflects the legal economists’ fear
that so doing would be to abdicate their calculators for armchairs. The economist, who
seeks empirical data, may find the prospect of navel gazing about fairness to be the
antithesis of his discipline. But the legal economist need not fear. Rather, just as the
legal economist may wish to empirically discover the best legal rule, he may also
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empirically test the strength of individuals’ tastes for fairness. Indeed, some studies have
found that the citizenry’s taste for fairness (or lack thereof) may not coincide with initial
expectations.166 Of course, fairness theorists may be unwilling to concede that fairness is
just a taste, but acknowledging that fairness exists will lead to better proposals and more
productive scholarship.
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